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Uganda’s 2021 presidential election shows that digital restrictions are becoming
a routine part of the country’s electoral cycle. Not coincidentally, social media is
increasingly used by political challengers such as Bobi Wine to mobilise popular
support. Innocent Anguyo reports from Kampala on the election and
relationship between Museveni’s government and the shifting online sphere.
In the last month, it was incredible to experience Uganda’s state-imposed internet and
social media outages roll back the years to the late 90s, when the country was
miserably married to analogue forms of communication.
As a millennial, I am a member of what is possibly the last generation of Ugandans to
have had an internet-zero childhood. Unlike myself, to my younger sister – a digital
native Gen Z unused to life before the internet and widespread access to portable
digital technologies – the  ve-day total internet blackout over the election period felt
eerily apocalyptic. For many it exposed a folly in thinking of internet access as a
fundamental right, particularly in a country where much of governance works through
ad hoc forms of communication.
Uganda blocked access to the internet and social media on the eve of presidential
elections held on 14 January 2021. Access to the internet was restored on 18 January,
but social media remains off limits. Millions of Ugandans do now have access to social
media with the help of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), but my sister and I did not
download the apps before the shutdown, and neither can we do so now as app stores
have been blocked too – probably because the opposition launched an app named ‘U
Vote’ for independent tallying of votes from polling stations. The government has also
threatened to close VPNs and go after those currently accessing social media. It’s not
clear when the remaining blockades will be lifted. But state media reports that Uganda
plans to maintain the shutdown of all platforms until the government deems they’re
safe from being used to fuel tensions in a country already deeply divided by the
election’s outcome.
Opposition from Besigye to Bobi Wine
With no clari cation of what safety constitutes in this context, and how internet/social
media comprises an existential threat to Uganda, analysts are accusing Museveni and
his ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party of abusing his incumbency to
incapacitate opposition actors from mobilising popular support against the outcome of
the election. But senior government o cials often respond by citing a ‘Plan B’ for
regime change hatched by four-time presidential candidate Dr Kizza Besigye as their
justi cation. Besigye last year announced he would not participate in the latest vote
cycle, referred to as Plan A, saying he would spearhead Plan B, which left all options on
the table in  ghting for regime change.
Plan B was intended to mobilise taxi drivers, boda boda (motorcycle taxi) riders and
students to demand freedom. He told the press:
‘Some of you think that  ghting is only using guns to  ght, but no. We have a range
of means we are going to use to  ght and we are not excluding any means as long
as we achieve our freedom. We can even force change before the next nomination
of presidential candidates is conducted.’
The government interpreted this as a veiled threat to trigger insecurity across the
country and instigate an insurrection. Besigye has a history of commanding massive
demonstrations that for several days bring business to a halt.
But Besigye’s pronouncements are yet to push the state to impose internet and social
media blackouts of the proportions currently experienced in Uganda. While it is his
physical presence and not his online mobilisation that sparks demonstrations, the
same cannot be said of the latest opposition political sensation, pop star-turned-
politician Bobi Wine, whose online instructions arouse mammoth crowds to action, as
does his physical presence. Of all political actors in Uganda, Wine and his six-month-old
political party, the National Unity Platform (NUP), run the most sophisticated digital
campaigns. Abiaz Rwamwiri, a Ugandan analyst shares this position. ‘What NUP
mastered from the start was having a social media presence. Their youth took over
social media, with no clear message but to promote their candidate but also abuse
anyone who didn’t agree with their candidate,’ Rwamwiri argued in an opinion piece. ‘It
is clear NRM lacked a clear-cut communication plan, especially the social media
strategy… In this new era, any campaign must recognise the power of social media.’
Nonetheless, as usual, what NRM fails to achieve through genuine competition it
makes up for with unfettered access to state resources and brute force. Incapable of
going head-to-head with Wine online, the internet shutdown was a display of the full
force of the state. They were not going to take any chances, especially after Wine and
other opposition candidates announced that they would challenge the election results
in the court of public opinion. Speaking to the BBC after the result’s announcement,
Wine said that ‘all options are now on the table including but not limited to peaceful
protest,’ but he stressed that he was not calling for violent insurrection. He maintained
that he would ‘be happy to share the videos of all the fraud and irregularities as soon as
the internet is restored,’ despite Museveni’s claims that the poll was potentially the
‘most cheating-free election’ in Uganda’s history. The result announced – rejected by
Wine – enables Museveni, 76, to extend his rule to 40 years.
The impact of the insurrection on the US Capitol
Having watched an election loser stoke insurrectionists to storm the US Capitol in
Washington DC, Museveni was intent on preventing a similar script playing out in
Uganda. Since Wine and his People Power movement emerged, Museveni has
helplessly watched them deploy social media to mobilise people for mass rallies and
protests, one of which was met with severe military brutality that led to the death of 54
Ugandans.
Social media facilitates the maximisation of user engagement – the ability to make
sensational and attention-grabbing content more visible – but Museveni’s political
strategists and the talking heads around him advised ignoring Wine’s online popularity.
To them, social media was not real life, after all. Museveni’s circle had organised
guerrilla warfare and successfully captured power. They had weathered a 20-year
insurgency in northern Uganda. They had outwitted all forms of opposition to rule for
35 years. They had wrestled Somalia back from the clutches of militants and restored
the country’s civilian governance. What could a political newbie like Wine and his
‘unemployed’ youthful online followers do to hurt the almighty NRM?
Defying the narrative, the 36-year-old Wine, born in a Kampala slum, went on to become
a legislator, put together a political party and became Museveni’s top challenger for the
presidency – all within three years. It was unthinkable that he would pose any
formidable competition. But he did. Wine and the NUP have dislodged Museveni and
the NRM from the Buganda region, home to the country’s capital, and largest
geographical-generator of national GDP. They swept Buganda from local council to the
presidency, removing the vice president (an MP for 25 years) and 10 ministers while at
it. Additionally, they routed the NRM in the Luwero triangle where Museveni started his
guerrilla war that propelled him to power in 1986, when Wine was a 1-year-old toddler
on feeding bottle. At their  rst time of asking, the NUP has captured 55 seats, making it
the largest opposition party in parliament. For a fresh presidential candidate, garnering
35% compared with Museveni’s 58% in the election is noteworthy. The myth of narrative
determinism has cost Museveni a core support base.
While Museveni securing another term may have been expected, he will have an
enormous challenge governing Uganda, especially the central region. For a leader who
works through a complex network steeped in patronage and patrimonialism, he has
long ruled by redistributing rent to create solidarity among different social groups and
facilitate political stability. As Adrian Leftwich accurately puts it, ‘leadership regularly
involves forging formal or informal coalitions, vertical or horizontal, of leaders and
elites, in order to solve the pervasive collective action problems’. Running a socially
diverse country like Uganda, where non-state public authorities hold signi cant sway,
requires a leader to negotiate multifaceted relationships with their power bases, which
political theorist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and others call a winning coalition.
For instance, the position of vice president has been held by a Catholic since 1994, and
by Catholics from the Buganda region since 2003, resulting from what is believed to
have been a gentleman’s agreement between Museveni and the then archbishop
Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala. Voters have now overwhelmingly rejected his vice
president and nearly all NRM parliamentary candidates in Buganda. Will Museveni,
baptised an Anglican, appoint a Muganda Catholic again or will he risk alienating them
by picking a vice president from West Nile or Acholi or Lango where he has secured
resounding victories for the  rst time? How will he keep Buganda at the high table
without appointing several MPs from the region to his cabinet?
Bobi Wine’s victory in Buganda despite state retaliations
The NRM and Museveni had perhaps misjudged Wine’s popularity as a politician, so
much so that they tried to counter his rise by hiring fellow musicians and celebrities to
campaign against him. The outcome has been catastrophic, even humiliating for
Museveni. Wine has in icted his  rst loss in Buganda since restoration of political
pluralism in the country. While Museveni has suggested that they lost in Buganda
because people there voted along tribal lines, it is vital to note that the region is
Uganda’s most cosmopolitan, ethnically diverse, developed, populous, educated and
wealthiest, drawing people seeking jobs and a better life from across the country. The
residents of Buganda have signi cantly more access to information to inform their
voting decisions than other regions. Wine strategically employed his rhetoric through
social media to spur people to action: only by repeatedly exposing the excesses of the
regime and showing clips of huge crowds attending his rallies was he able to create the
conditions in which his loyalists could imagine doing the unimaginable, ‘removing a
dictator’, as they put it. All of his rallies and encounters with the security forces were
streamed live. He was able to tap into people’s frustration with the regime and channel
that towards actual protest votes against Museveni and his party.
It was therefore no surprise that, a month before the polls, the government tried to clip
Wine’s wings by asking Google to block up to 14 Ugandan YouTube channels that
streamed his campaign rallies, alleging the channels imperilled Uganda’s security. The
channels cited jointly boasted 59 million views and 300,000 followers. This was an
attempt to further narrow Bobi Wine’s campaigning space after the government had
successfully threatened radio and TV operators against hosting him. Hypocritically,
government had actually banned political rallies in favour of media-facilitated
campaigning to stem the spread of COVID-19. Ultimately, Google declined the request,
asking the government to provide a court order. After failing to remove the channels,
the messenger became the target. On 27 December 2020, Ashraf Kasirye, the
cameraman for one of the YouTube channels, was shot in the head while covering
Wine. Weeks earlier, he’d been left unconscious after being pepper sprayed during the
opposition leader’s arrest.
Online blockades as a short-term game
While this was the  rst time Kampala had blocked the entire internet, other forms of
digital restrictions, alongside violence against opponents, have become a routine  xture
in every vote cycle. In 2006, websites critical of the state were inaccessible, in 2011 text
messaging was hampered, and in 2016 social media and money transfers were halted.
Commentators are concerned that the recurring shutdowns are a methodical ploy to
keep the country and the world in the dark while the security forces crack down on
political opponents, the media, demonstrators and civil society. Going such lengths at
the expense of livelihoods and normalcy for Ugandans is inexcusable. Unless Museveni
and the NRM  x the country’s structural conditions, failures of public goods and
insecurity that contribute to Wine’s popularity, any stopgap acts of political expediency
won’t fully eradicate the charge for change, and their next loss may well be larger than
Buganda.
Closer to my heart – it breaks me to see the daily sight of my little sister laying desolate
on the couch unable to get in touch with her friends and resume her online classes.
Beyond the politics, how else should a child socialise during a pandemic?
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